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Abstract  
 
This paper seeks to examine the impact of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on the provision of financial 
payment services in Nigeria. We have carried out a selective appraisal of the liability of financial institutions as well as payment 
system providers that have deployed ICT tools in the delivery of their services in relation to cases of forgery, fraud, mistake and 
system failure; while assuming at all times that the customer or client is faultless, The paper examines the selected issues 
within the precincts of the extant legal regime in Nigeria with a view to ascertaining if they suffice for the regulation of the 
relationship between customers and financial institution.  
 
 
 
 Introduction  1.
 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and its tools have had an unprecedented impact on financial 
Institutions and payment systems in Nigeria in the past decade. For example, the issuance of debit cards by financial 
institutions and card payment schemes like phone cards provide a good source of liquidity, income and loan for the 
issuer. This is because, upon receipt of payment for the electronic value that is issued, there is a time lag before the 
value purchased and issued is redeemed and spent, thus, creating a float which the issuer can make use of, interest - 
free. (Aniyic, 2004) More obvious, is the fact that the incorporation of ICT tools into the mechanics of the Nigerian banking 
and payment system services poses challenges to the Nigerian legal jurisprudence as a result of the fact that it has 
raised legal issues some of which our existing legal framework seems illequipped to deal with. For example, while the 
advancements and innovations in ICT are progressing at a geometric rate, the necessary regulatory framework is 
progressing at an arithmetic rate. Also, electronic products such as the Automated Teller Machine (ATM), which was 
invented to ease the problem of cash withdrawal is now fast becoming a nemesis for the users as complaints trail its use. 
This development has given birth to more than was bargained for by all parties to the relationship in terms of liability 
which usually is apportioned on the basis of fault.  
 
 Forgery  2.
 
The possibility of forgery of ICT -tools utilised by financial institutions is a reality. Most electronic products deployed by 
financial institutions in Nigeria are based on the smart card technology and they have fallen prey to forgers as the 
technology for this exists and is within the reach of all who can pay for same.  
Smart cards like ATM, Debit and Credit cards have fallen prey to forgers; the technology for this exists and is within 
the reach of all who can pay for same. Our focus is the determination of the liability of financial institutions whose e-tools 
have been fraudulently copied and as a result of which a client suffers is a determination of the legal status of a smart 
card and the accompanying PIN: combined are they analogous to a signed cheque? It is submitted that combined, a 
smart card and PIN are analogous to a signed cheque. This submission is premised on the knowledge of what the signed 
cheque and the smart card combined with the PIN are used to accomplish.  
A signed cheque is used to convey mandate to the financial institution. This is the use to which a smart card and 
PIN is put. To make possible their use, the signature and the PIN are a shared secret: the financial institution usually has 
in its database; a sample of the customer's signature and in the case of smart cards, the financial institution also has in its 
database the PIN of its customer with which it compares and confirms the identity and mandate of the customer. It is this 
mandate that nowadays, is being forged. Thus, where a card which was fraudulently copied or stolen and the fraudulently 
acquired PIN is used to interact with a financial institution with the aim of making a withdrawal, it is submitted that the 
mandate which is consequently conveyed when the duplicate card and the fraudulently acquired PIN is used, amounts to 
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a forged mandate and is tantamount to a no mandate from the customer/ client and the financial institution cannot 
premise its debiting the latter's account on this. And in a situation where there is no mandate preceding the debiting of a 
client/ customer's account, it is submitted that a financial institution who has debited a client' account is liable to make a 
refund of the amount debited without mandate to the affected client/ customer. This is because it is trite that a financial 
institution is only entitled to pay in accordance with a valid mandate from its customer; that a forged mandate is not a 
valid mandate.  
Furthermore, certain concepts contained in the Bills of Exchange Act which does not relate to negotiability are 
adaptable to e-banking and payment systems services and are thus, capable of making the financial institution’s liability 
for the forgery as espoused above. The Act provides that where a signature is forged, the forged signature is wholly 
inoperative and no right to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto can be acquired through or under that 
signature. (See section 24, Bills of Exchange Act, Cap. B8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004; Latunji v. Cooperative 
Bank of Western Nigeria Ltd.(1979); Nig. Advertising Service Ltd. v. UBA Ltd. (1965).  
Thus, it is submitted that in relation to an e-service or product provided by a financial institution of which there has 
been a forgery which was not due to the customer’s fault or negligence, the liability accruing there from, is that of the 
financial institution. (Nig. Advertising Service Ltd. v. UBA Ltd., supra)  
 
 Fraud  3.
 
Statistics show that financial losses due to bank fraud in Nigeria increased from N105 million in 1989 to N6,367 million in 
1999. This shows approximately 98% increase in loss due to bank fraud within a ten - year period (Igbinovia, 2003). 
Fraud in financial institutions which have deployed ICT - tools manifests in various forms and could be perpetuated by 
either staffs of the financial institutions, customers, or third parties. The situation is alarming and has given birth to a 
myriad of reactions. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) recognising the pervasiveness of e-banking and payment 
systems in Nigeria and the propensity of them being used to perpetuate fraud, formulated the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Guidelines on Electronic Banking in Nigeria of August, 2003 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Guidelines’). These Guidelines 
are to regulate the use of e-tools as well as provision of e-serb by financial institutions in Nigeria.  
The Guidelines are an attempt at checkmating fraud perpetuated by bank staff and criminal third parties. Amongst 
other things, they stipulate that banks providing internet banking services should put in place procedures for the 
maintenance of the bank’s website, ensure that only authorised staff are allowed to update or change information on the 
website and ensure that the Internet Service Provider (ISP) has incorporated a firewall to protect the bank's website 
where it is out - sourced. Thus, where the bank, due to its negligence and/or professional laxity, fails to comply with the 
directives of the CBN, it is submitted that the delinquent bank is liable to the customer who is defrauded subsequent to an 
unauthorised access of his/her records or information with the bank.  
The foregoing submission is premised on the fact that a bank is under a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill 
with regards to the customer’s affair (Benson v. Otubor (1975); Agbanelo v. UBN [2007]) and that the Guidelines are a re 
- statement of that duty. In Agbanelo v. UBN Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held per Ayoola, JSC that:  
A bank has a duty under its contract with its customer to exercise reasonable care and skill in carrying out its part 
with regard to operations within its contracts with its customers. The duty to exercise reasonable care and skill extends 
over the whole range of banking business within the contract with the customer.  
Thus, when a bank fails to exercise reasonable care and skill with regards to its customers’ affairs, it is submitted 
that the bank is negligent and has failed to observe the standard expected of a reasonable banker. The foregoing is 
applicable, mutatis mutandi to other non-banking financial institutions and payment systems providers. Furthermore, the 
Guidelines state that bank will be considered liable for fraud arising from card skimming and counterfeiting in relation to 
ATM cards.  
 
 Mistake  4.
 
The mistakes that could probably occur in relation to transactions involving financial institutions providing services along 
the line of e-banking and payment systems and their customers are numerous. For example, in relation to electronic 
credit or funds transfer, where a paying institution due to an administrative or clerical mistake and under a mandate given 
by the payer to the paying institution, makes payment to an unintended payee, it is submitted that a mistake of fact has 
occurred. The position of the law in relation to mistake of facts is that, the money paid is recoverable from the beneficiary, 
who in this case is the unintended payee by means of an action for money had and received or for money paid under a 
mistake of fact. Also, an affected party can invoke the equitable doctrine of tracing, to recover the money mistakenly 
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transferred to the unintended recipient.  
The right of the payer or paying bank to recover an amount paid due to a mistake of fact is a common law remedy 
and is enforced by the plaintiff bringing an action against the payee or the receiving bank for the recovery of money had 
and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff. The claim is a purely personal one and it is therefore 
enforceable whether the defendant still has the money received by him or not.  
Alternatively, a paying bank can invoke the doctrine of tracing. This will enable the former to recover the amount 
debited from the financial institution. The equitable tracing remedy could be extended so as to enable a bank which is 
induced to make a payment under a mistake to recover the amount credited from that bank. The court has held that a 
bank which pays money under a mistake of fact to a collecting bank may either recover the amount paid from the 
collection bank’s customer or from the collecting bank itself to the extent of the credit balance on the customer’s account, 
or may alternatively trace the amount through the customer’s account, into any assets paid with it, or receive it, in the 
event of the customer’s insolvency, out of his general assets. (Banque Belge v. Hambrouk (1921); Chase Manhattan 
Bank NA v. Israel British Bank Ltd. (1981))  
It is submitted that if money is paid under a mistake of fact, the equitable title in the property therefore remains 
vested in the payer and the payee is subject to a corresponding fiduciary duty to make restoration of what has never been 
his property. The paying bank may, therefore, recover funds paid to the receiving bank under a mistake of fact or, if they 
are further transferred into an account at another bank, it may recover them out of that account. The bank may also claim 
and enforce a charge over assets acquired with the funds obtained from it. However, it does not follow that the holder of 
the account with the paying bank whose account is initially wrongly debited may assert a similar tracing claim. His rights 
are limited to having his account with the paying bank re-credited.  
The grounds of which payment may be recovered because it is made under a mistake of fact do not depend on the 
manner in which the payment is made: they are dependent on the fact that payment is made under a mistake. 
Consequently, a payment made due to a material mistake of fact or other such error may be recoverable either from the 
payee or from the receiving bank, whether the payment is by means of an electronic transfer or any other electronic 
means.  
Furthermore, where a person pays money to another under a mistake of fact, the payer is prima facie entitled to 
recover the money paid under the mistake of fact (Barclays Bank Ltd. v. WJ Simms, son &. Cooke (Southern) Ltd. & 
Anor.[1979]). The foregoing is possible if the payment made in error was made as a result of a mistake of fact and the 
payee is not an agent, who had thereafter paid out same to his principal. See the dictum of Sir Greene, MR in Gowers v. 
Lloyds & NPF Bank (1938).  
However, where the receiving institution has paid out the money to the payee the money is recoverable; but in this 
case, the option is to take out an action against the payee. In such a situation, the receiving institution is an agent of the 
payee and the latter is the position of a principal and it is the position of the law that it is the principal that can be sued in 
the above case (National Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Intl. Ltd. (1974)).  
Also, an error or mistake could result from the activities of the staff of the financial institution. For example, 
authorised personnel in the course of entering information in the database of the financial institutions could enter a wrong 
digit, which would bring about consequences that are as varied as the ken of the entire humanity. It is submitted that the 
financial institution is liable to the customer/client in so far as it is proven that the staff acted in a manner, which is less 
than what is expected of a person of his/ her status position; while acting within the limits of the dictates of his/her 
employment and in such a situation, the employer - the financial institution - would be vicariously liable.  
Thus, notwithstanding the seemingly exotic nature of transactions carried out with the aid of ICT - tools, banks and 
other financial institutions that have deployed them, are liable to make a refund of the money erroneously paid to them as 
collecting bank as is the case with in a traditional paper-based transaction.  
 
 Systems Failure  5.
 
In a situation where a customer suffers financial loss due to an ATM or Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) systems failure or 
malfunction, which a financial institution is experiencing or has experienced, the aggrieved customer may decide to seek 
recompense from the former. The question, which will be a corollary to the foregoing state of affairs, is: “can the financial 
institution avoid the claim brought against it, or call it pass the burden of settling the claim to another party”?  
In resolving the above question, the point of reference will ultimately be the formal contract between the banker or 
e-payment service provider and the customer. Lord Justice Bankes (Joacliimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation [1921], held 
that there are a number of implied super-added obligations beyond the one specifically mentioned in Foley v. Hill [1848]. 
In Agbanelo v. UBN Ltd. [2007], the Supreme Court held that in addition to the obligation as a debtor which the bank 
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owes its customer, it is under a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in carrying out its part of the contract between it 
and the customer.  
However, parties to contracts are in principle, free to limit or exclude the obligations attached to their various 
undertakings and/or obligations in and arising from the contract by the inclusion in amongst the terms of the contract, an 
exemption, limitation or exclusion clause (Sagay, 2000, 159 et. seq.). Thus, financial institutions providing e-banking and 
payment services can and do insert in their terms of agreement with their customers exemption/exclusion clauses.  
It is here submitted that where a financial institution, due to systems failure or malfunction, does not meet up with 
its obligation under the contract between it and its customer; the former is in breach of the terms of the contract, and it 
amounts to a fundamental breach when the aftermath of the failure of one of the party to perform a primary obligation has 
the effect of depriving the other party of substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties that the 
injured party should obtain from the contract.  
The focus of this discourse presently turns on whether in circumstances as that espoused above, the inserted 
clause will at all times avail financial institutions in view of the duty upon them. The issue is resolvable with the application 
of the time honoured canons of the law of contract as well as the provisions of the laws of the various States of the 
Federation which regulate contracts and contractual agreements to the relationship between a financial institution which 
has deployed e-tools in the delivery of services to its customers and the latter. The leaning of the law in Nigeria has made 
it impossible for a party that is guilty of a fundamental breach to rely upon an exemption clause so as to escape liability 
(IMNL v. Pegofor Industries Ltd. [2005], 17 - 18 and 24 - 26: section 190 of Contracts Law, Cap. 32. Revised Laws of 
Anambra State, 1991).  
As a result of the foregoing, it is submitted that a financial institution which has deployed e-tools and which has 
incorporated an exclusion/exemption or limiting clause cannot escape liability where there has been a system failure as a 
result of its negligence which has resulted in a fundamental breach of the contract. This is because, a fundamental 
breach of the terms of the contract amounts to a destruction of the substratum of the contract and would entitle the 
aggrieved party to seek to refuse further performance of the contract where same is possible; and any 
exemption/exclusion clause inserted in the contract will not be enforced in favour of the e-tool deploying financial 
institution. The position of the financial institution is worsened if it is shown that it had been negligent.  
Furthermore, in the case where there is no formal contract or express term between the parties - like is the case of 
the relationship between some banks in Nigeria which provide e-services who compel their customers to use ATM cards 
without the latter applying for signing any document relating to the ATM facility, or agreeing to any express term in 
relation to the ATM facility - insofar as there is a relationship between the financial institution and the customer that could 
be construed as that between a professional and a client, it is implied that the financial institution will exercise reasonable 
care and skill in rendering service to the client.  
 
 Conclusion  6.
 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the incorporation of ICT tools into the mechanics of service delivery by financial 
institutions in Nigeria poses challenges to the legal regime in the polity. However, without doubt, it is submitted that the 
challenges are capable of being taken care of by the provisions of the polity’s legal regime. To this end, judicial activism 
is enjoined: for it is with this that the dynamics which these new challenges pose can be met, head on. It is submitted that 
this imbroglio is resolvable by the grafting on to this esoteric situation the principles of tort and the provisions of the law of 
contract.  
The adoption of the foregoing proposal is a better strategy compared to the clamour for the making of a body of 
laws targeted at the e-milieu as well as lCT, for it will allow for piecemeal development of the law in relation to 
transactions within that environment. It is also submitted that an attempt to bring the law in pace with technological 
change by enactment amounts to an exercise in futility for as fast as the law strains to catch up with technological 
change, the latter moves ahead to outpace the law.  
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